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Abstract
Following the political changes in the early 1990s, the South African government introduced a comprehensive reform pro-
cess for the water sector with the goal of achieving an enhanced and more equitable water management system. This paper 
analyses the existing water allocation situations and applies a non-linear optimisation model to investigate the optimal intra- 
and inter-regional allocation regimes in the Middle Olifants sub-basin of South Africa. Economic issues such as efficiency 
gains related to water transfers are discussed and calculated water price elasticities and estimated water demand functions 
provide necessary fundamentals for further modelling work. Social and environmental aspects are accounted for by includ-
ing constant water demands in the model. Results show higher benefits from inter-regional water allocation. Reducing water 
supply levels to conform to the sustainable water supply policy, it can be shown that although water supply is reduced by 
approximately 50%, total benefits from water use are only reduced by 5% and 11% for inter- and intra-regional allocation 
regimes, respectively. These results indicate that alternative water allocation mechanisms can serve as policy instruments to 
offset the effects of water scarcity. 
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Introduction
Water is one of the most indispensable of all natural resources; 
it is essential for human beings, economic development and 
biodiversity. However, many countries have to face the chal-
lenge of rapidly growing water demands, driven by an increas-
ing population and economic growth, linked to urbanisation, 
industrialisation and mechanisation (King, 2004). The resulting 
water scarcity is one of the most pervasive natural resource 
allocation problems faced by development planners. Hence, 
water resource management seems to have become one of the 
important political, social and economic issues of the present 
century and economists face new challenges of growing water 
demands and changing laws and institutions (Louw, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is also recognized that water scarcity not 
only originates from quantitative or qualitative scarcity, but 
also from inefficient use and poor management (Dinar, 2003). 
Therefore, the need for efficient, equitable and sustainable 
water allocation policies is evident and new water management 
studies aim at investigating innovative strategies to yield more 
efficient water allocations (Rosegrant et al., 2000; Ringler, 
2001). 
South Africa is one of many countries in the world expe-
riencing water shortages. The increasing competition between 
water users, decreasing water supply levels and the high and 
ever mounting demand for freshwater are some of the major 
problems South Africa is facing (Hassan and Crafford, 2006). 
Consequently, current water uses are exceeding sustainable 
natural availability and groundwater is being mined (Conradie, 
2002). As a response to this severe problem, the South African 
Government introduced the National Water Act (NWA; Act 
No. 36 of 1998), promoting an integrated and decentralised 
water resource management approach. The new law empha-
sizes the importance of economic efficiency, environmental 
protection, equity and the empowerment of people (Hassan and 
Crafford, 2006). This requires water managers and policymak-
ers to have a thorough understanding of the economic values 
of water and its various uses as well as powerful informa-
tion systems that integrate hydrological, economic and social 
dimensions of water supply and demand within the frame-
work of an integrated water resource management (IWRM) 
system (McKinney et al., 1999). There has been growing 
national interest and recognition of the role that market-based 
approaches can play in facilitating and improving water 
demand management (Howe et al., 1986). This includes infor-
mation and knowledge on water-use efficiencies and the value 
of water in its different uses, price elasticities of water demand, 
as well as necessary institutional and political settings. 
Nevertheless, information in this regard hardly exists, and it is 
a challenging undertaking to achieve sustainable and efficient 
water management. Institutions are usually lagging far behind 
the need for more appropriate policies, and analytical tools to 
provide water resource management agencies with guidelines 
to introduce a feasible integrated water resource management 
approach are lacking (Louw, 2002).
This paper aims to model water allocation mechanisms 
in the Middle Olifants area. After the political changes of the 
last decade, reforms in the water sector led to improved water 
management and provided the legal framework for water 
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transfers between different water users. The study analyses the 
hypothetical effects of water transfers between the most impor-
tant water users (households, mining and irrigated agriculture) 
employing water demand functions, which are based on pri-
mary data for large-scale agriculture and the mining sector and 
on secondary data for urban households. The analysis takes 
place at the sectoral level and discusses economic issues such 
as efficiency gains related to water transfers. Calculated water 
price elasticities and estimated water demand functions provide 
necessary fundamentals for further modelling work. Although 
this approach is based on economic theory, social and environ-
mental aspects are accounted for but treated as constants. This 
is unfortunately a shortcoming of the model as it does not allow 
for a full reflection of the complex interactions between the 
efficient use of water and the environmental and social impacts 
of water allocations based on market mechanisms. This paper 
is organised as follows: the consequent sections present some 
background information on the study area, the objectives of the 
research and a summary of relevant literature. After presenta-
tion of the conceptual framework outlining the basic structure 
of the model, demand coefficients and the final model structure 
are elaborated in the subsequent section. In the last section, the 
main results are presented and conclusions are drawn. 
Background and objectives
National Water Act
There are 2 main new Acts, the Water Services Act and the 
National Water Act (NWA), which have brought essential 
transformations to the South African water sector (Nieuwoudt 
et al., 2004). The Water Services Act (1997; Act No. 108 of 
1997) guarantees the right to a basic amount of drinking water 
and sanitation services, which obliges all governmental levels 
to assure the provisions of drinking water and basic sanitation 
services (Republic of South Africa, 2002). The NWA provides 
the legislative framework for the management of water as a 
national resource, an improved integration of groundwater 
and surface water as well as a better water quality and quan-
tity management. The new law identifies sustainability and 
equity as central principles (Republic of South Africa, 1998), 
and it identifies the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF), now re-named as the Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA), as the custodian of the country ś water resources, and 
requires a decentralised water resource management system to 
be developed at the catchment level (DWAF, 2002).
To fulfil the objectives of efficiency, equity and sustainabil-
ity, it sets the following priorities in water allocation:
• Provision of the `Reserve’, which consists of two parts: the 
‘ecological Reserve’ and the ‘basic human needs Reserve’ 
• Meeting water needs for international rights and obliga-
tions; actions to be taken to meet projected future water 
needs; and  water use of strategic importance: (e.g. power 
generation)
• Meeting the needs of the general social and economic uses
Furthermore, it acknowledges the possibility of temporary 
transfers of water entitlements and therefore creates the legal 
framework for water markets as allocation strategies. As the 
Act emphasizes decentralised water management, water man-
agement areas (WMAs) have been established. Catchment 
management agencies (CMAs) are to be established in all 19 
WMAs to delegate water resource management planning to 
the regional or catchment level ensuring participation of local 
communities. For each WMA, the amount of water reserved 
for prioritised needs (‘Reserve’) is determined by the National 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA).
The amount set aside for the ‘basic human needs Reserve’ 
is determined through the implementation of the national Free 
Basic Water (FBW) policy guaranteeing access to water for 
basic human needs (25 litres per capita per day), as water is 
formally recognised as a human right in the South African 
Constitution. This conforms to the global policy where the 
United Nations declared water as a human right in July 2010. 
However, the member states did not agree on any binding quan-
tity of water to be secured. 
General social and economic uses constitute actual water 
demands of the various water users in South Africa, such as 
industries, agriculture, services and households as well as the 
environment. As the water resource development potential has 
reached its limits in many WMAs, the option of an applicable 
water demand management approach needs to be explored. 
According to Hassan and Farolfi (2005) water allocation deci-
sions are currently made on the basis of limited information 
derived from water users´ behaviour in the different economic 
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management, the South African Government has so far 
addressed important administrative approaches like water user 
registration and licensing processes. A market-driven approach 
with the aim of benefit maximization from water use, based on 
the economic valuation of water, would further support more 
efficient and sustainable water use. This study explores the role 
of economic instruments in improved water management.
Study area
The Middle Olifants (MO) sub-basin (see Fig. 1) is located in 
the Olifants basin, which is the third most water-stressed basin 
in South Africa. Based on hydrological features, the MO is 
sub-divided into 5 tertiary catchments.
The Middle Olifants sub-basin, with an area of 22 550 
km2, is home to 60% of the total Olifants basin population. In 
cooperation with the Water Research Commission (WRC) it 
was selected as a pilot study area due to the growing competi-
tion between water users, its prevailing severe overuse of water 
resources, and imbalanced water distribution. Water demands are 
already at their peak for consumption and production purposes.  
Table 1 shows that water requirements are exceeding availabili-
ties, resulting in a water imbalance in the different sub-basins. 
At around 500 mm/a, rainfall is very low and over-abstraction of 
groundwater resources has already led to the lowering of ground-
water levels in the whole study area (DWAF, 2003).
Table 1








 Upper Olifants 410 409   -1
 Middle Olifants 395 301 -94
 Steelport   95   61 -34
 Lower Olifants 164 101 -63
Source: DWAF (2004), modified
The Middle Olifants has a predominantly rural character 
with scattered formal and informal villages; many of them 
located in the former homeland areas (DWAF, 2003) where 
households are still disadvantaged in terms of access to com-
munal services, education and employment. Main water users 
in the area comprise urban and rural households, large-scale 
agriculture and the mining industry. Most households are 
historically disadvantaged and live in rural areas with limited 
access to water. In Limpopo, which is the province containing 
the largest share of the Middle Olifants, 15% of the households 
are classified as poor – having a household income of less than 
ZAR800 per month (StatsSA, 2007). About 20% of the popula-
tion is not yet being served by free basic water (DWA, 2010).
Several large-scale irrigation farmers produce for the world 
market and use high volumes of water (Levite et al., 2002). 
Although the physical infrastructure of several small-scale irri-
gation projects exists, most of these were not in operation at the 
time of data collection and did not demand significant amounts 
of water. Furthermore, major backyard irrigation at the level of 
single households hardly exists and was not considered in the 
analysis. 
Objectives
This paper presents a first attempt to provide a modelling 
framework for the determination of sectoral water demands 
under different water supply regimes. The study focuses on 
optimal water allocation levels in the 3 principal competing 
water user sectors, namely, large-scale irrigation, mining, and 
domestic use, with the objective of maximising total ben-
efits from water use. For the rest of this paper use of the term 
‘domestic sector’ will refer to urban households. Water require-
ments of rural households will be considered within the ‘basic 
human needs Reserve’ as these households are not using more 
water than is required for basic human needs. For the model 
this implies that ecological requirements and basic human 
needs are treated as constant and are subtracted from total 
water availability. 
The specific objectives of the analysis include:
• Identification of water demand functions and water price 
elasticities for the large-scale agricultural sector, urban 
households and the mining sector. For rural households no 
demand function can be determined as, based on the data 
collected, rural households do not consume more than 25 
litres per capita per day (that is, the basic human needs), 
which are provided for free. This amount of water cor-
responds to the ‘basic human needs Reserve’ of the NWA 
(1998) and is considered in the modelling framework as 
a constant. This means that only urban households are 
included in the allocation decision, while water used by 
rural households is fixed and will always be guaranteed.
• Analysis of alternative allocation mechanisms, while max-
imising total benefits from water use. Equity and sustaina-
bility issues as addressed by the NWA and its prioritisation 
approach limits water allocation to a sustainable amount, 
considering basic human and ecological needs.
• Impact analysis of policy interventions on water demand 
and allocation structures. 
Expected outputs include information on the efficient use of 
water through water transfers among the 5 tertiary catchments 
in the Middle Olifants sub-basin and the 3 economic sectors 
therein. Results will provide support for future water manage-
ment and decision making alternatives regarding water alloca-
tion exploring several scenarios applicable to the study area. 
However, the authors would like to acknowledge that water 
quality aspects and environmental externalities that might 
accrue through water transfers are not considered in the present 
analysis. Reasons for this omission lie in data and time con-
straints, leaving room for future research.  
Literature review 
Due to the deteriorating water scarcity situation and the subse-
quent water allocation problems, the water management focus 
has seen a paradigm shift from supply management (mainly 
through the increase of water availability via water supply 
infrastructure and other technical solutions) to demand man-
agement (through improved technologies, incentives, re-design 
of tariffs). Several studies have dealt with optimal water alloca-
tions in different regions of the world. They differ in the type 
of data used, applied methods and biophysical factors included. 
McKinney et al. (1999) provide a good overview of market 
valuations of water uses applied in different studies. Booker 
and Young (1994) developed a river optimisation model for 
the Colorado River to identify optimal inter-regional alloca-
tions and prices. They find that benefits from water use could 
be increased by up to 50% solely through market transfers. 
Rosegrant et al. (2000) developed an integrated economic-
hydrologic model for the Maipo River Basin in Chile that does 
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not solely consider water allocation but also takes into account 
interactions of water allocation and agricultural productiv-
ity, non-agricultural water demand and resource degradation. 
Consequently, the model estimates economic as well as social 
gains from efficiency improvements of water use. The model 
consists of nodes and links, representing physical entities and 
links between these entities. Water sources, water inflows and 
water demands are modelled, including agricultural, municipal 
and industrial water demand. With the objective of maximis-
ing benefits from water use, water demand and supply are 
integrated into an endogenous system determining efficient 
water allocations. Model results show that reallocations to 
higher water values yield higher benefits from water use, 
which is driven by differences in the marginal values of water. 
The model could be improved by including further inputs to 
agricultural production and using empirically-estimated data 
on household and industrial water demand rather than using 
literature-based elasticities. 
Louw (2002) developed a methodology to estimate the true 
value of water in the Berg River water management area in 
South Africa and evaluated potential impacts of a water market 
on the efficient utilisation of water. With a positive mathemati-
cal programming model, the author developed a spatial equilib-
rium model to predict the impact of a potential water market. In 
addition to irrigation, water for urban uses like households and 
industries is also included. The true value of water in irrigation 
was found to vary significantly between areas in the basin, with 
the marginal value of water ranging between zero and 20 ZAR/
m³ (ZAR=South African Rand). These differences indicate that 
significant gains from allocative mechanisms are possible in 
these areas. Mahan et al. (2002) determined efficient allocation 
of surface water resources in Southern Alberta, Canada, by 
employing a standard welfare maximising objective function. 
They find that intra-regional transfer from low value uses to 
high value uses yields substantial benefit increases of around 
6% compared to the status quo situation. They conclude that 
efficiency improvements through market pricing are likely to 
be relatively large.
Rodgers and Zaafrano (2002; 2003) developed an inte-
grated economic-hydrologic water resource simulation-opti-
misation model for the Brantas Basin in East Java, Indonesia. 
They estimate municipal water demands using data from a 
household survey. However, for the estimation of industrial 
water demands they use average water values and literature-
based water demand elasticities, and the agricultural water 
demand function is based on different studies of rice yields 
and FAO yield coefficients. The model is able to simulate new 
infrastructure allowing the analysis of benefits associated with 
the construction of 2 new dams. Hence, the model not only 
emphasises water demand management but also considers the 
supply side. Draper et al. (2003) developed an economic-engi-
neering optimisation model for California. They maximised the 
economic value of agricultural and urban water uses represent-
ing water demands for the year 2020 levels of development, 
using state survey data. Limitations of the model include the 
consideration of only 2 economic sectors and environmental 
regulation could not be modelled accurately. Jenkins et al. 
(2004) developed a large-scale economic-engineering optimisa-
tion model of California’s water supply system. Results sug-
gest significant improvements to system operation and water 
allocations through water transfers and exchanges, conjunctive 
use, and various operational changes to increase flexibility. 
The authors show that there is great potential to improve the 
flexibility and economic performance of the water system and 
that both water scarcity and scarcity costs can be considerably 
reduced. However limitations of the model include simplifica-
tions of conditions and processes, quality of existing data sets, 
restrictions imposed by the model, and time constraints. 
A holistic model embedding water resources and eco-
nomic components into a mathematical programming model 
for the Maipo River Basin in Chile was developed by Cai et 
al. (2001; 2006) and Cai (2008), building upon the work of 
Rosegrant et al. (2000). The model optimises water allocation 
by maximising economic profits from water uses in various 
sectors and confirmed previous results where welfare gains 
could be reached through reallocations to high value uses. In 
West Africa, Ahrends et al. (2008) looked at coupling hydro-
logical-economic modelling for optimising irrigation in West 
Africa while Bharati et al. (2008) used a dynamic coupling of 
economic and hydrological modelling to explore conjunctive 
irrigation water use in the Volta basin. 
All of the above studies concluded that potential gains in 
the use value of water could be obtained through the hypo-
thetical introduction of water markets which lead to improved 
water use efficiencies. This study aims to contribute to present 
literature by using an economic model, based on supply figures 
which are provided by the hydrological model and based on 
primary data on water demands. Unlike most other studies, 
which rely on ‘literature-based’ demand coefficients and other 
parameters, this study used self-collected data and self-esti-
mated coefficients and elasticities, adding plausibility to model 
results.
Conceptual framework 
Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework of the whole mod-
elling process. Water supply levels as an output of the water 
resources model (WRM) and water demand coefficients, as 
the estimated parameters of water demand equations, provide 
the optimal allocation model (OAM) with necessary param-
eters. The WRM was provided by DWAF and updated by the 
project partners at the University of Witten/Herdecke, GmbH, 
Germany. 
The WRM is a hydrological model based on the modifica-
tion and further refinements for better operation of the Water 
Situation Assessment Model (WSAM) (DWAF, 2007), which 
uses all water demands and available resources in each qua-
ternary catchment and quantifies surpluses and deficits. The 
time frame of WSAM is based on average annual yield data, 
accounting for seasonal variations. The calculation of the yield 
accounting water balance consists of 2 main components: water 
resource yields and water requirements. Available water yields 
are not distributed equally between different requirements but 
rather according to the priorities defined in the NWA (DWAF, 
2005). 
Respective water supply levels can be modelled in 2 dif-
ferent ways. The first model is unconstrained, neglecting basic 
human and ecological needs and thus also neglecting the terms 
under the NWA. In the following, this will always be referred 
to as policy condition ‘without consideration of the NWA’. 
Results identify benefit gains from water re-allocations under 2 
scenarios (see section below). 
The second model analyses water allocation levels if avail-
able water is reduced according to NWA levels, which are 
derived from WSAM data by subtracting basic human needs 
as well as ecological Reserves from total available supply for 
each tertiary catchment. In the following, this will always be 
referred to as policy condition ‘with consideration of the NWA’. 
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Hence, in the OAM model these reserves are 
not treated as free variables but are rather 
entering the model as constants and sustain-
able water supply levels are results of the 
WRM, modelled in such a way that it gives 
priority to environmental flows and basic 
human needs (rural households). It is impor-
tant to note that urban and rural households 
are considered separately within the domestic 
sector. While for urban water demand, a water 
demand function was estimated and is thus 
part of the optimisation process, rural water 
demand is fixed and thus considered as a con-
straint of the model. Hence, the provision of 
water for rural areas does not underlie any effi-
ciency objectives but purely social ones. This 
mirrors the free basic water policy of the South 
African Government with the assumption that 
rural households are provided with the basic 
amount of water (25 ℓ per capita per day) free 
of charge and that their water needs do not 
exceed this rate. Demand coefficients for irrigation, mining and 
urban domestic households were estimated separately; employ-
ing various methods of valuation (see Appendix 1). Water for 
irrigation is valued by simulating a water demand function 
via mathematical programming models. Reasons for applying 
mathematical programming instead of econometric estimation 
include the fact that farmers are not paying according to water 
used but according to area irrigated. This makes direct estima-
tion of water demand functions, which are based on quantities 
of water used at various price levels, generally difficult. 
Water user charges and quantity schedules are simulated 
with an optimisation model in GAMS (General Algebraic 
Modelling System), maximising farm profits with varying 
water user charges. Demand functions are obtained by fitting 
regression equations and point water user charge elasticities 
are calculated. Water demand in the mining sector is estimated 
with econometric methods using time-series data. A Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure is applied to estimate 
cost functions for the 5 mines analysed and water price elas-
ticities and water demand functions are calculated. Using the 
estimated cost functions, water demands can be derived by 
varying the water price, holding all other inputs and outputs 
constant. The valuation of urban domestic water uses allows for 
a direct estimation of demand functions using an econometric 
model (see Appendix 1).
Through benefit maximisation, optimal water allocations 
via water transfers between user sectors and regions can be 
defined. Various policy simulations give information on pos-
sible policy mechanisms to influence optimal water allocation 
levels, according to equity considerations and future popula-
tion growth. The model is flexible to explore potential con-
temporary scenarios proposed by decision makers in South 
Africa and can provide support in policy decisions with regard 
to water allocations. The temporal dimension of the model is 
annual while spatially it is limited to the Middle Olifants sub-
basin, with a further sub-division into 5 tertiary catchments 
(see Fig. 1). 
Optimal allocation model (OAM)
Typically prices reflect market scarcity as well as the equi-
librium between demand and transportation and supply costs 
(Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998). If this is not the case, there is 
market imperfection and that impedes the market from adjust-
ing to changes in quantities demanded or to changes in costs 
of supply. Hence, political and institutional mechanisms must 
be established to ensure an efficient water use. Although the 
NWA provides the constitutional framework for water markets 
and technical water research has received priority in the past, 
little is known about the economics of water use and impacts of 
alternative water policies (Nieuwoudt, 2000). 
The following section analyses gains from water re-
allocation among households, irrigation and the mining sector 
in the Middle Olifants, using a non-linear optimisation model, 
which is maximising total benefits resulting from water use. 
As a first step, benefits from water re-allocations under current 
water uses are analysed; secondly, water availability is reduced 
according to the NWA and new allocation levels are estimated.
Water demand functions
With a non-linear model, the potential of re-allocation of 
water entitlements is simulated by deterministic mathemati-
cal optimisation. The model consists of defined inverse 
water demand functions for each water-using sector (see 
Appendix 1). Table shows the fitted water demand functional 
forms and their inverse representation; these are the essen-
tial elements for benefit calculations in the optimal alloca-
tion model. For the domestic sector, a Stone-Geary (recipro-
cal) function was fitted. For irrigation and mining, a linear 
logarithmic function and double-log linear function were 
found to show the best fit, respectively. For all 3 models 
different functional forms were estimated in STATA and the 
respective R-squared values were compared (for examples 
in irrigation, see Appendix 1). Therefore, the various coeffi-
cients vary for each tertiary catchment. The coefficients are 
represented by a and b while the quantity of water demanded 
is represented by Qw and the price of water by Pw, for ter-
tiary catchments q and water users in the domestic, irriga-
tion and mining sectors represented by d, a and m, respec-
tively. Coefficients for each tertiary catchment are available 
from the authors on request.  
Figure 2
Conceptual framework
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Derived water demand functions for different uses show 
varying water price elasticities with the most inelastic water 
demand for households. Table 3 shows water price elasticities 
for alternate uses for each tertiary catchment calculated (Eq. 
(1)) with Qw as the water quantity and Pw as the water price: 
                  (1)
For households and irrigation, elasticities are calculated per 
tertiary catchment, whereas in the mining sector water price 
elasticities are calculated for each mine. For all sectors, elastici-
ties are calculated at average consumption levels and prices.
Table 3
Water price elasticities per sector and catchment
Sector B31 B32 B51 B52 B71
Domestic -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036





In irrigation elasticities are estimated to be -0.20, -0.19 and 
-0.18 in catchments B31, B32 and B51, respectively, indicating 
the weak price-responsiveness behaviour of farmers. Within 
current price ranges, demand for irrigation water appears to 
be price inelastic and will only become elastic at much higher 
price ranges, at around 10 ZAR/m3. The low elasticity estimate 
may be related to the relatively low average water-user charges 
attached to irrigation (0.07 ZAR/m3). Given the inelasticity of 
water demand, limited substitution possibilities for irrigation 
water, risk aversion of farmers and the low share of water in 
total costs, increasing irrigation tariffs may not help to substan-
tially decrease quantities of irrigation water used on farms. 
Results are comparable to those of other studies using 
mathematical programming or econometric estimation. One 
example is the study of Clark et al. (1986), who developed a 
static linear programming model for determining the short-
term demand for irrigation water in the Murrumbidgee 
Valley in Australia. The authors found elasticities between 
-0.131 and -0.646 for the lower price ranges.  Further exam-
ples are Kulshreshtha and Tewari (1991), who calculated 
derived demand functions for different farms in the South 
Saskatchewan River Irrigation District in Canada using vari-
able resource price programming. Computed point elasticities 
at realistic price ranges (-0.05 to -0.73) are far below unity. 
Moore et al. (1994) estimated water demand equations using 
Heckman ś estimation procedure. The price of water is proxied 
by the estimated marginal cost of pumping groundwater and 
calculated elasticities range from -0.03 to -0.10. More recent 
studies (Appels et al., 2004; Bontemps and Couture, 2002; 
Doppler et al., 2002) apply similar methods to different areas 
and results of inelastic irrigation water demand are similar for 
all regions.  
Households react even less to a water price change, which 
is reflected in the low water price elasticity of only -0.04. 
Though results of other comparable studies are mixed and 
scarce, the dominant finding is that domestic water demand is 
inelastic (Van Vuuren et al., 2004; Olmstead et al., 2007 (for 
USA); Gill and Punt, 2010). These results show that increas-
ing water prices hardly affect agricultural and urban domestic 
water demand so that other political measurements must rather 
be applied to influence water demands. In the mining sector, 
water price elasticities are from -0.76 to -0.95, relatively higher 
than in the agricultural and domestic sector, yet inelastic. The 
low elasticities in irrigation and domestic uses can be explained 
by the fact that water is an essential good. Households are less 
sensitive to water price changes since they are highly depend-
ent on water for their day to day activities. The same is true 
for irrigation where water is the major input in the production 
process, while this is relatively not true for the mining sector, 
where substitution possibilities can be found where water is 
not the only input and also not a relatively major input as in 
agriculture.
Model structure
Representative data on water availability is provided by the 
hydrological model WSAM (DWAF, 1998). Assumptions 
underlying the OAM include perfectly competitive markets, 
deterministic water supply and demand, and partial rather than 
general equilibrium. Our results, based on the assumption of 
the neo-classical economic theory of perfect market conditions, 
should be interpreted with caution. We believe that this will 
form a basis for an appropriate water user charge (tariff) set-
ting, which should be combined with an institutional economic 
approach to the water scarcity problem.
These assumptions require water to be seen as an economic 
good, where efficiency aspects are decisive for the allocation 
between high and low value uses and if necessary the real-
location to high value uses (Moran and Dann, 2008). The 
model does not consider water quality issues, distribution and 
transportation costs. Hydrological flows, such as return flows, 
will not explicitly be considered since they are included in the 
calculations of the WSAM data, implying that any changes in 
off-take will lead to changes in return flows. However, model 
results show that these changes in return flows are marginal 
and can be neglected. The optimisation model is programmed 
in GAMS, where the different sets and subsets for catchments 
q and water uses u, including households, irrigation and min-
ing, are formulated. Further sets contain the parameters of the 
inverse water demand functions represented as coefficients a 
and b. The objective function maximises total benefits TB as 
the sum of the areas under the inverse demand curves (Mahan 
 
Table 2 
Water demand functions 
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et al., 2002; Nieuwoudt et al., 2004). Considering households, 
irrigation and mining, the model can be formulated as:
                  (2)
where: 
Fqu (Qw) are the inverse functions for water consumption Qw
Benefits from each water usage u (d, a and m) in each catch-
ment q (B31, B32, B51, B52, B71) can be calculated as the area 
under the inverse demand functions (see Table 2), from the 
upper limit Qw to the minimum quantity demanded Qmin at the 
choke price CP, plus the rectangle from the choke price and 
the corresponding minimum amount demanded (see Fig. 3). 
The choke price defines the backstop price, at which quantity 
demanded becomes exactly zero or approximately zero. 
Using equations from Table 2 the choke price at Qmin is 
calculated and entered into the benefit functions. If the integral 
of the functional form does not converge, it is necessary to add 
the rectangle from the choke price and the corresponding mini-
mum amount demanded to the benefit function. Equations 3, 4 
and 5, respectively, show the benefit functions for the domestic, 
irrigation and mining sectors with a and b as the coefficients 
for the functional forms shown in Table 2.
                  (3)
                  (4)
                  (5)
Since water is not available without limitation, total water 
availability per catchment Sq represents the major restriction in 
the model.
                  (6)
where: 
u  =  domestic, irrigation and mining sectors
q  =  B31, B32, B51, B52, B71
TC =  treatment costs for domestic water uses
Distribution losses, which are assumed not to enter into return 
flows but to simply be sinks, account for 25% (Polokwane 
Municipality, 2006) in the domestic and agricultural sectors 
(Tren and Schur, 2000), while they add up to 10% in the mining 
sector (DWAF, 1998). 
Model results 
In this section, impacts of alternative allocation mechanisms 
based on 2 different water availability levels and sensitivity 
analyses are presented. The allocation mechanisms to be ana-
lysed include intra- and inter-regional trade regimes, which will 
be compared to the status quo situation where current water use 
will be considered and the NWA is not fulfilled. 
Scenario 1: Intra-regional water allocation: Water can only 
be re-allocated within a tertiary catchment but not between 
tertiary catchments.
Scenario 2: Inter-regional water allocation: Water can be re-
allocated in the whole Middle Olifants, that is, between tertiary 
catchments.
Besides water quantities, changes in total benefits due to the 
allocation mechanisms will be analysed. In a second step, 
simulation scenarios reflecting current policies and future 
developments are developed. 
Simulation 1: Policy-makers may introduce an upper limit to 
domestic water tariffs to ensure basic water quantities, par-
ticularly for low-income and poor households. This is in line 
with the equity objective of the NWA. However, it should be 
noted that basic water needs according to the NWA are already 
assured. 
Simulation 2: Policy-makers may set a minimum price for 
large-scale irrigation farmers to make a first step towards 
appropriate water pricing and to cross-subsidise the domestic 
sector.
Simulation 3: Population growth and increased urbanisation 
in the year 2050: This simulation consists of a prediction of 
population growth and urbanisation rates based on data from 
Statistical Services, South Africa.
All simulations are modelled at inter- and intra-regional trade 
water allocation regimes.
Current water use (2007)
To be able to analyse the impact of re-allocation and changes 
in allocation based on the fulfilment of the requirements of 
the NWA, the existing water use of the year 2007 is modelled. 
Currently, most of the available water (93%) is used by com-
mercial farmers for crop irrigation. Only 4.7% of the water is 
consumed by urban and rural households and 2.3% by mines. 
The fact that current water use is highly unsustainable becomes 
obvious when comparing current demand to sustainable water 
supply in accordance with the NWA (1998) at the catchment 
level. A negative balance of about 170 m. m3 per year is wit-
nessed in the Middle Olifants sub-basin (see Fig. 4), implying 
that groundwater is mined and water is used unsustainably. 
All catchments, with the exception of Catchment B71, exhibit 














































Benefits of water consumption
Source: Mahan et al. (2002) modified
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Catchment B31, in which the gap is almost 3 times as high as 
sustainable supply. The strong negative balance forms the need 
for an improved – more sustainable – water management strat-
egy in accordance with the principles of the NWA.
Effects of water re-allocation
In this section, the effects of water re-allocation within and 
between tertiary catchments will be analysed under 2 differ-
ent policy conditions. Firstly, effects purely resulting from 
water re-allocation will be determined using current water 
demands in the status quo situation. Available water amounts 
do not change in this policy condition, implying that water is 
used unsustainably and that the NWA is not considered. This 
makes it possible to separately estimate the benefits from re-
allocation only after having estimated efficient water use levels. 
Model results (as shown in Table 4, column ‘without NWA’) 
support the assumption of positive benefit effects from water 
re-allocation.
The status quo situation shows current water demand 
levels for each sector at the historical level from 2007, reflect-
ing an average year. Corresponding benefits are highest in 
irrigation, representing 95% of total benefits. Total water use 
in the Middle Olifants amounts to around 424 m. m3 per year. 
Permitting water transfers within tertiary catchments, as in 
Scenario 1, while water availabilities are kept constant at the 
status quo level (‘without NWA’), results in small water re-
allocations from irrigation to mining, confirming the assump-
tion of water transfers from low to high-value uses. Water 
allocation in the mining sector increases by 37% (9.8 to 13.5, 
second row) while there is a decrease of only 1% in irrigation 
(393.6 to 391.6, first row). Although some mines have more 
water available than needed, others have difficulties in receiv-
ing the amount of water they need and the according licences, 
which will make increased water allocation levels very useful 
for them. Total benefits increase by 1.6 and 2.9 m. ZAR per 
year in Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, with the implication 
that benefits are higher when water transfers are allowed in the 
whole Middle Olifants, and not only within tertiary catchments. 
In Scenario 2 water allocations to irrigation further decrease to 
some extent, while allocations increase by around 69% in the 
mining sector, compared to Scenario 1. In the domestic sector, 
water allocation levels stay the same as in the status quo situa-
tion, reflecting very low elasticities of households. 
Since current water levels are unsustainable and do not 
comply with South African policies and the NWA, we deter-
mine new water allocation levels under reduced water avail-
abilities (which complies with the NWA) in a second analysis. 
This allows the consideration of basic human and environ-
mental needs, but also means that the water availability in the 
Middle Olifants has to be decreased by more than 50% to reach 
a sustainable supply level of about 190 m. m3. In Scenario 1, 
we witness an increase of 82% in the mining sector compared 
to the status quo situation, while water allocation in irrigation 
is reduced by 58%. As agriculture represents an important 
employer for the rural population in the area, WUAs and 
farmers argue that decreased water supplies to the agricultural 
sector would lead to lower production, high unemployment 
rates and food insecurity. However, as Backeberg (2006) states, 
according to the National Water Resource Strategy, irrigation 
agriculture will have to be competitive even if contributing 
to food security. This implies that agriculture should not be 
artificially protected and that water allocation decisions should 
–in the long run – follow economic principles. However, the 
Act favours exceptions for subsistence farmers, to support rural 
development and reduce rural poverty. Thus, we are of the 
opinion that further research that allows the inclusion of other 
water users such as small-scale and emerging farmers would 
add value to the results of this study.   
It can be shown that water re-allocation presents an appro-
priate means to tackle the problem of water scarcity since, 
although water availabilities are reduced by almost 50%, total 
benefits under Scenario 1 only decrease by around 11% com-




























Water supply and 
demand gap per tertiary 
catchment (in m. m3/a)
Source: own simulations
Table 4
Water use Q (in m. m3) and benefits (in m. ZAR) under free market conditions
Sector Status quo Without NWA With NWA
Current water 
demands
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
 Q                 Benefits Q                 Benefits Q                 Benefits Q                 Benefits Q                 Benefits 
Irrigation 393.9 2557.1 391.6 2556.8 382.5 2556.2 167.0 2265.7 181.4 2429.1
Mining 9.8 29.1 13.5 30.9 22.8 32.8 17.9 31.2 1.5 26.9
Domestic 7.3 99.7 7.3 99.7 7.3 99.7 7.1 99.3 7.2 99.7
Total 424.1 2685.9 424.1 2687.5 425.2 2688.8 192 2396.2 190.1 2555.6
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(5%). It is important to note that the model does not consider 
any employment aspects and the impact of water re-allocation 
on farming and mining labour cannot be quantified. As agri-
culture is the biggest employer in the area, the impact on the 
unemployment rate of reducing water use by over 50% should 
be considered in further developments of the model. Thus, 
results of this study should be considered with caution. Reasons 
for low benefit decrease, especially in agriculture, can be 
found in high water values. As water became scarcer, its value 
increased accordingly, resulting in relatively high benefits as 
water is re-allocated, particularly in Catchment B31, where 
the increase in the water value is around 8 ZAR/m3 (relatively 
high), when compared to the initial value of close to zero.  As 
the model only considers purely economic aspects, social 
aspects are neglected in this phase of the modelling work and 
results might not reflect true implementation possibilities, as 
farmers will not be able to pay 8 ZAR/m3. However, other stud-
ies (see Louw, 2002) found even higher water values in irriga-
tion with 0-20 ZAR/m3.     
Water allocations in Scenario 2 are reduced by 54%, 85% 
and 1.5%, respectively, in irrigation, mining and domestic use, 
compared to the status quo situation. Low water allocations to 
mining can be explained with differences in available water 
supplies in tertiary catchments (see Fig. 4) where, especially 
in catchments B52 and B71, gaps between current demand and 
sustainable supply are only slightly negative (B52) or even posi-
tive (B71). This leads to lower water values, resulting in a re-
allocation to catchments with highly negative gaps and higher 
water values. In tertiary catchment B31, the value of water is 
very high and water is re-allocated from B71 and B52 to B31. 
This is different to the first situation where the NWA is not 
considered and water supply levels are much higher. Resulting 
water values are lower as more water is available than under the 
conditions of the NWA. Differences in total water use levels 
result from different distribution losses that are accounted for 
in the model. 
Generally, results show that water markets represent 
political measures to increase water use efficiencies through 
re-allocation of water to its high value uses. Benefits increase 
the most in Scenario 2 in both situations (‘without’ and ‘with’ 
NWA). However, it must be noted that high transportation costs 
might accrue, due to large distances, which are not accounted 
for in the model and which would need further research as it 
represents a setback of the model. Transportation costs are 
probably quite high in the Middle Olifants, because more water 
is required upstream than downstream. In particular, Scenario 
2, in which water can be traded between tertiary catchments, 
would generate higher transportation costs than Scenario 1. 
Thus, interpretation of results has to consider these shortcom-
ings. However, we believe that the model can serve as back-
ground work for further applications and can be modified to 
integrate the transaction costs for future model validation.  
Policy simulations
Given the fact that water is not a purely economic good and 
that equity aspects play a major role in the new South African 
policy, we ran relevant policy simulations and analysed result-
ing impacts on the allocation levels under Scenarios 1 and 
2. Further simulations investigate the effects of a population 
increase in the year 2050 and consequently the effects of 
increased water demands of the urban domestic sector. All 
policy simulations are based on supply levels with considera-
tion of the NWA.
Policy Simulations 1 and 2: Equity issues
Up until this point, modelling results have only taken into 
account efficiency aspects. However, in many cases efficiency 
considerations fail to consider the backward and forward link-
ages among sectors and other non-market uses of water, leading 
to the incorporation of equity and sustainability issues. This 
raises the question of the allocation of water resources in such 
a way that the standard of living of most people is improved, 
which is also a major concern of the South African policy 
(Juana et al., 2006).  According to the policy of Black eco-
nomic empowerment, the South African government attempts 
to redress past racial inequities by assuring water availability 
and affordability to all households. Hence, no additional water 
should be allocated to large-scale commercial farmers, who are 
mostly white and relatively affluent; instead, the water needs of 
the previously disadvantaged population should be prioritised. 
This simulation attempts to address the issue by analysing dif-
ferent policy interventions on the water pricing system. 
In a first simulation, the end-user price in the domestic 
sector will be restricted to a maximum level of 4 ZAR/m3. This 
price was arbitrarily chosen, but we oriented ourselves on the 
current water price, and chose a lower one to analyse equity 
effects. Compared to the current average water price in the 3 
provinces considered (Mpumalanga, Limpopo and Gauteng) of 
5.69 ZAR/m3, and compared to water prices of up to 8 ZAR/
m3 in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, households would have to 
pay much less for their water. In practical terms, price changes 
can be implemented at the water source where raw water is 
extracted and the change in raw water tariffs will be translated 
to the end-user prices. All the simulations on price changes 
refer to changes at the water source and raw water prices.
In the second simulation we try to account for the policy of 
curbing water supply to irrigation by restricting the end-user 
price for large-scale irrigation farmers to a minimum level of 
2.5 ZAR/m3 ceteris paribus. Again this price was arbitrarily 
chosen as somewhere between the prices that households and 
mines pay.  Since currently farmers pay very low prices for 
water, this price restriction is relatively rigorous; nevertheless it 
would be in line with the policies of Government. These mini-
mum and maximum water tariffs for households and farmers 
can easily be changed and adapted in further simulations.  
Table 5 (next page) shows simulation results under 
Scenarios 1 and 2 and resulting allocation levels and benefits 
for the whole Middle Olifants for each sector.
Compared to results in Table 4 (the ‘with NWA’ Scenario 
1 and 2 results), water quantities do not change remarkably as 
a result of the domestic water price restriction. Under Scenario 
1, domestic water allocation increases from 7.1 (see Table 4) to 
7.4 m. m3, corresponding to a 4% increase, while it increases by 
only 3% in Scenario 2. Although quantities of water used are 
higher than those without price restriction, benefits decrease as 
the water price restriction does not lead to efficient water use. 
Total benefits are, at 2 394 and 2 555 m. ZAR, slightly lower 
than benefits without the price restriction, reflecting the low 
impact of water price restriction in the domestic sector.
Looking at the restriction in irrigation, we realize that 
higher water prices for farmers have a high impact on the 
allocation levels and benefits. Due to the higher water price, 
farmers are demanding around 33 m. m3 (-20%) less water 
compared to the unrestricted model under Scenario 1, while 
water use decreases by only 6% under Scenario 2. In Scenario 
1, total water use is, at 158.4 m. m3, lower than sustainable 
availability. Due to the high water price in irrigation, less is 
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demanded and more is available for households. However, in 
tertiary catchments B32 and B51 water is not re-allocated from 
irrigation to households (in catchments B32 and B51 there are 
no mining activities), since it would not be efficient and water 
is therefore left unused. In Scenario 2 all water available is 
used, and is re-allocated to the mining sector in catchments 
B52 and B71. The resulting high increase in water use in the 
mining sector and the corresponding low increase in benefits, 
reflects the inefficient water re-allocation due to price restric-
tions in irrigation. Even in the domestic sector water allocation 
increased slightly to 7.4 m. m3. Total benefits in the Middle 
Olifants decrease by around 2% and 1% in Scenarios 1 and 2, 
respectively, compared to the analysis considering the NWA 
without price restrictions.
Results show that policy instruments (altering prices) 
can be one of the means to influence allocation levels under 
market conditions. By restricting domestic water prices to a 
maximum of 4 ZAR per m3, for example, water is re-allocated 
from irrigation to urban households. Due to the lower water 
prices for households, they are encouraged to consume more 
water. However, compared to the high domestic water price 
reduction of around 50%, the increase of demand by the urban 
households is, at 4% and 3%, relatively low, reflecting the 
low water price elasticity of households (see Table 3). This 
shows that interfering in the water pricing policy can be one 
instrument for the government to support (urban) households 
and re-allocate water from irrigation. Nevertheless, to realise 
higher re-allocation amounts to households, further measure-
ments should be applied. Looking at the pricing instrument for 
farms, it could be shown that higher water prices in irrigation 
lead to highly decreased demands in the sector, and do not 
support reallocations to households but rather to the mining 
sector. Hence, it does not represent an appropriate instrument if 
households are the ones to be favoured.
Policy Simulation 3: Population increase
This scenario is based on population growth rates and urbani-
sation until the year 2050. According to the higher population 
figures, the amount of water assigned to the ‘basic human 
needs Reserve’ increases. As the Reserve is prioritised by the 
NWA, this decreases the amount of water to be freely allocated 
to the other sectors. Table 6 presents the new allocation figures 
per sector. All sectors get less water in 2050 than in 2007. 
The amount of water allocated to urban households is least 
reduced with only a 0.03% and 0.05% reduction in Scenario 1 
and 2 (2050), respectively, compared to the allocation in 2007 
(see Table 4). However, as the number of urban households 
increases due to population growth and urbanisation, less water 
per person is available. While in 2007, every person was enti-
tled to 30.8 m3/a (Scenario 1) or 31 m3/a (Scenario 2) of water 
available in urban areas; these numbers decline until 2050, to 
22.9 m3/a (Scenario 1 2050) and 23 m3/a (Scenario 2 2050). 
As rural households are being served from the ‘basic human 
needs Reserve’, which is now increased in absolute terms, they 
still receive 9 m3/a per person which is equivalent to the basic 
amount of 25 ℓ per capita per day.
As water levels allocated to urban households hardly 
decrease, increased allocation of water to the ‘basic human 
needs Reserve’ comes at the expense of the irrigation and the 
mining sector. The amount of water allocated to both sectors 
decreases by 1.1% and 7.7%, respectively, compared to the 
corresponding amounts in 2007 in Scenario 1. Scenario 2 leads 
to savings in irrigation of 1.7% and of 4% in the mining sector. 
Accordingly, changes in benefits are marginal, with less than 
1% decrease in the sectors. Price changes are also very low.
Table 6
Water use Q (in m. m3) and benefits (in m. ZAR) 
under Policy Simulation 3
 Sector
 
Scenario 1 (2050) Scenario 2 (2050)
Q Benefits Q Benefits
Irrigation 165.1 2259.6 178.3 2422.4
Mining 16.5 30.9 1.4 26.8
Urban households 7.1 99.3 7.2 99.7
Total 188.7 2389.8 186.9 2548.8
Source: own simulations
Conclusions 
As development of new water sources in the Middle Olifants 
is not feasible (DWAF, 2004), using water efficiently and 
allocating it in such a way that it meets the economic and 
socio-political objectives of the country, is crucial for future 
sustainable water availability. Therefore, this study developed 
a methodology to determine optimal water allocations under 
different water supply levels based on calculated water price 
elasticities and water demand functions. Results allow conclu-
sions on the impacts of water reallocations between main water 
users - households, mining and irrigated agriculture- through 
water trade. Furthermore, the model helped to analyse the 
effects of policy instruments such as price restrictions on water 
allocation. 
Firstly, as a result of allowing free trade between sec-
tors, the model shows higher economic returns to water in the 
mining sector in the ‘without NWA’ analysis, and results of 
the study suggest water transfers from irrigation to mining 
in order to maximise benefits from water use, while domestic 
water use stays relatively unchanged (with negligible transfer 
to mining as well). However, the authors would like to empha-
sise that efficiency increases could indeed be easily achieved 
in the model, but might not be as easy to implement in prac-
tice. Due to current regulations like the existing lawful water 
use rights of farmers, immediate action might not be feasible 
and water transfers through market-driven approaches should 
rather be seen as a long-term process. Furthermore, necessary 
Table 5
Water use Q (in m. m3) and benefits (in m. ZAR) under policy simulations 1 and 2
 
Sector
Domestic water price ≤ 4 ZAR/m3 Irrigation water price ≥ 2.5 ZAR/m3
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
 Q Benefits Q Benefits Q Benefits Q Benefits
Irrigation 166.7 2 263.4 181.1 2 428.5 133.4 2212.8 171.1 2 405.4
Mining 17.8 31.2 1.5 26.9 17.9 31.2 13.1 31.8
Domestic 7.4 99.6 7.4 99.6 7.1 99.3 7.3 99.7
Total 191.9 2 394.2 190.0 2 555.0 158.4 2 343.3 191.4 2 537.0
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institutions, laws and regulations must be established. A reduc-
tion of total water availability as suggested by the NWA leads 
to highest reductions in irrigation, followed by the mining sec-
tor, and only marginal reductions for urban households. 
 The model not only provides insights on re-allocations but 
also on water values, which will be important for future policy 
decisions. Results imply that water user charges should be 
higher than currently applied. Furthermore, calculated elastici-
ties provide valuable information that should be considered 
in the design of improved water demand management. The 
elasticities allow changes in demand when prices are increased 
to be foreseen, which is especially helpful for water suppliers, 
in order to calculate their returns to water provided and antici-
pated changes in quantities needed.
In order to address the issue of historically disadvantaged 
individuals the South African policy pursues the objective to 
divert more water to the needy, for domestic use. Our model 
results show that the Government intention of gradually cap-
ping water for irrigation does not only meet the socio-political 
objective but has an economic rationale, especially when 
transferred to mining. However, results also show that no more 
water is transferred to the domestic sector, and even fixed 
maximum water prices would only have a minor impact on 
water transfers. Hence, model results favour the slow diversion 
of water from irrigation to mining, but not to domestic water 
users. This is in line with the economic objectives but at the 
same time does not follow equity considerations stated in the 
NWA. Therefore, besides purely market-driven mechanisms 
the Government must find other measures, such as changed 
water licences and improved water distribution networks, to 
support the domestic sector. 
We found that with growing water scarcity, water trade 
and water re-allocations can play an increasing role as water 
use becomes more efficient, as evidenced by the lower (5-11%) 
reduction in total benefits from water use compared to the 
relatively high (about 50%) reduction of water supply accord-
ing to the NWA. Both intra-and inter-regional allocation results 
provide evidence for benefits of water re-allocations. Assuming 
that intra-regional allocation involves fewer transaction costs 
than the inter-regional allocation in the short run, the intra-
regional allocation might be even more beneficial; this would 
need to be validated through further research. However, the 
intra-regional allocation involves some water loss in B71 as 
the sustainable supply is higher than what is actually used. 
Therefore, intra-regional allocation will be more effective in 
future when the Government makes use of this water once 
the planned several mining companies in B71 are in place 
(Conradie, 2007).
Although this study provides insights into water demands, 
potential benefits from water trade and policy instruments 
related to water pricing, it should be kept in mind that economic 
reasoning alone cannot underlie a new water demand manage-
ment approach, and equity aspects have to be considered. More 
research and data are needed to be able to incorporate equity and 
environmental demands, in a better manner than merely as sim-
ple constraints, into economic modelling of the Middle Olifants 
sub-basin. Furthermore, appropriate Governmental institutions 
and regulations are necessary preconditions for the establishment 
of a water trading system in South Africa. 
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Appendix 1
Agricultural demand estimation
Agricultural water demand schedules were determined with 
mathematical programming using primary data from 2007. For 
each sub-basin a regional farm model was established apply-
ing the representative farm approach. The objective function 
of each single representative farm model is specified as net 
annual income Z resulting from n crops grown. It is maximised 
by selecting the optimal land areas of crops subject to water 
availability.  
                     (A.1)
where: 
pi is the output price of the crop product i
yi the yield of crop i
xi  is the cropped and irrigated area with crop i
ci are the crop production costs of crop i not considering 
water costs 
cw are electricity costs of pumping water, which depend on 
water quantity applied. 
The model is of a long-run nature since it also considers activi-
ties that differ from each other by their capital investment 
like permanent crops and it considers irrigation establishment 
investment costs.    
In a first step for 3 of the 5 catchments a representative 
farm was determined and modelled subject to land, water and 
rotation constraints. Annualised capital costs were included for 
permanent crops and irrigation equipment. After model valida-
tion, demand schedules were developed by varying the water 
price. Through horizontal summation of the demand schedules 
of the individual producers in the area an aggregate derived 
water demand schedule could be determined. Since results of 
programming models can only depict stepped demand sched-
ules, demand functions were obtained by fitting regression 
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the best fit in most of the cases. Representatively for the other 2 
catchments Table A1 shows different functional forms and their 
fit calculated in Stata. Inverse demand functions were estab-
lished through solving for P.
 
Demand estimation in the mining sector
Water demand for 5 mines in the MO was determined by esti-
mating a translog cost function with primary time series data 
over several months. 
                     (A.2)
where: 
t = 1, ……, T represents the periods and indexes i and j with 
i, j = water, electricity, labour, capital, diesel correspond to 
variable inputs n. Index y represents output and the index t 
refers to monthly observations and reflects the time series 
character.
                     (A.3)
where:
Sit represents the cost share of input i at date t. 
This partial differentiation of the cost function with respect to 
the price of 1 input yields the demand function of that input, 
which is dependent on the level of output and the vector of 
input prices. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is used to 
estimate the systems of equations jointly with correlated dis-
turbances. The parameter estimates of the translog functional 
form cannot be interpreted directly, but they can be used for 
further calculations of water price and cross-price elasticities. 
The water demand function can be derived from the share 
equation. 
Domestic demand estimation
Demand estimation was based on secondary data of local 
municipalities from the years 2005/2006 to 2008/2009 
(National Treasury, South Africa, Water Service Development 
Plans, WSIS, 2009). Socio-economic data were used from 
the Census 2001 and Household Survey 2007 (StatsSA, 2001; 
StatsSA, 2007). The combination of the different data sources 
resulted in an unbalanced panel data set with 38 municipalities 
and 150 observations in total. Municipalities with only a flat-
rate tariff structure and with missing data were excluded from 
the analysis. A drawback of the data is that no data on water 
use and water bills at the individual household level were avail-
able.  In addition to this, non-payment of water bills constitutes 
a major problem in South Africa due to the ‘non-payment 
culture’ for services which dates back to the Apartheid regime 
(King, 2005). However, the rate of non-payment had to be 
neglected. The following Stone-Geary water demand function 
was estimated econometrically:
                     (A.4)
where: 
θ is the parameter to be estimated for the income-price 
relation and ϑ is the subsistence level of water which is non-
responsive to prices. The price variable p used in the esti-
mation refers to the average price calculated based on the 
increasing block rates tariff system implemented in most 
municipalities. The vector z comprises all socio-economic 
variables that were included to control for socio-economic 
differences in water demand (population over 65 years, 
average household size, backlog rate (in terms of water pro-
vision), and dummy variables for the provinces). Estimation 
results reveal a very low price elasticity of -0.036.
  
Table A1 
Functional forms for agricultural water demand 
Functional form Catchment B31 R2 N 
Linear 0875.95913752  EwPwQ  0.664 25 
Double-log linear 405.0079  wPEwQ  0.787 25 
Exponential )127.0(081 wPeEwQ
  0.896 25 
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